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We study a zero-sum partially observed semi-Markov game with average payoff on
a countable state space. Under certain ergodicity conditions we show that a saddle point
equilibrium exists. We achieve this by solving the corresponding average cost optimality
equation using a span contraction method. The average value is shown to be the unique
zero of a Lipschitz continuous function. A value iteration scheme is developed to compute
the value.
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1. Introduction
We study a partially observed zero-sum semi-Markov game (POSMG) with average payoff criterion on a countable state
space and with compact action spaces. Though there is considerable literature on completely observed semi-Markov game
(COSMG) with average payoff, e.g., [13–15,20], the corresponding results for POSMG do not seem to be available. The main
diﬃculty lies in the fact that most of the ergodicity conditions required to study COSMG do not remain invariant under the
transformation from POSMG to COSMG. Since the POSMG model is studied via a transformation to COSMG, we need to look
for a suitable ergodicity condition. Following [21] we assume that a particular state is observed with a given probability
which leads to an ergodicity condition for the COSMG. Using this we establish the existence of a saddle point equilibrium
for the problem.
For the purpose of establishing an equilibrium point for an average cost problem, the standard approach is to consider
the corresponding discounted cost problem with a discount factor 0 < α < 1. After establishing the equilibrium point for
this problem one achieves the result for average cost problem by letting α → 1 in an appropriate manner. Here we adopt a
different approach. We obtain the result by solving the average cost optimality equation (ACOE) directly. Such an approach was
taken in [8] to solve a completely observable stochastic game. Our approach in this paper is similar in spirit to that in [8].
But it is more involved from a technical viewpoint. We ﬁrst construct a one parameter family of span contractions on some
appropriate Banach space and show that there is a unique member of that family which is a contraction. Finally we identify
the value of the game to be the parameter of that contraction operator in the family and then ﬁnd the equilibrium point in
stationary strategies. This new technique leads to a value iteration scheme. We show the convergence of this scheme. This
is one of the main contributions of this paper.
Through the optimality equation we show that the saddle point strategies depend only on the current estimate of the
unobserved state. Thus the players use observation for estimating the unobserved state, and then employ only the state
estimates in their optimal playing. Thus we establish a ‘separation principle’ in an indirect manner. This is explained in
Remark 4.2.
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actions of the players are known to all players, is studied in [10]. There is another class of stochastic games with partial
information where the state is observed but the players do not observe one another’s past actions. For this class of problems
we refer to [18] and the references therein.
Our paper is structured as follows. The POSMG model is described in Section 2. An equivalent COSMG model is con-
structed in Section 3. Since the results in this section goes in a standard line we omit many details and leave proper
references. The existence of a saddle point equilibrium is established in Section 4. A value iteration scheme is described in
Section 5. We conclude our paper in Section 6 with a few remarks.
2. POSMGmodel
For a topological space S , let B(S) denote the Borel σ -algebra and P(S) denote the set of probability measures on S ,
endowed with the topology of weak convergence. A partially observed semi-Markov game (POSMG) model is a controlled
stochastic dynamical system speciﬁed by a collection of objects (X, Y , A1, A2, P S , P F , Q , Q 0, r). Here X and Y are countable
sets which are the state and observation sets; A1 and A2 are compact metric spaces which are the action sets of players 1
and 2, respectively. The map P S : X × A1 × A2 → P(X), describes the state transition law and P F : X × A1 × A2 → P(R+),
describes the holding time distribution at a given state. The observation kernel is given by Q : A1 × A2 × X → P(Y ),
and Q 0 : X → P(Y ) is the initial observation kernel. Throughout the game, player II pays a reward to player I at a rate
r : X × A1 × A2 → R, ﬁxed during the sojourn time. All maps mentioned above are assumed to be Borel measurable.
The game is played over an inﬁnite time horizon. Let N0 be the set of all nonnegative integers. The sequence {Xn, n ∈ N0}
denotes the successive states attained in the game. This process is called the state process. In POSMG model the players do
not observe the state process. Instead another process {Yn, n ∈N0} taking values in Y is available to the players for decision
making. The process {Yn} is called the observation process.
We describe the dynamics of the game in detail. At the pre-initial stage both the players know the a priori distribution
ψ of the initial state X0. Conditional on the event {X0 = x0} the observation Y0 is generated by the kernel Q 0(· | x0), i.e.,
Prob(Y0 = y0 | X0 = x0) = Q 0(y0 | x0) (where Q 0(y0 | x0) denotes Q 0({y0} | x0); similar notations will be used hereafter).
Immediately the players choose actions a10 ∈ A1, a20 ∈ A2 simultaneously and independently of each other and player I starts
getting an (unobserved) payoff at a rate r(x0,a10,a
2
0) from player II until the transition to the next state occurs. Transition
happens only after a random time T0 distributed as P F (dt | x0,a10,a20). The new state X1 gets generated by the transition law
P S(· | x0,a10,a20) and players observe Y1 = y1 with the probability Q (y1 | a10,a20, x1) corresponding to the event {X1 = x1}.
Subsequently players choose next actions and the game proceeds in a similar manner by an inﬁnite repetition. All the facts
mentioned above are common knowledge to the players and each player at any time can recall the past observations and
past actions of each other.
To construct a mathematical model of the game described above we construct the probability space on which all the
random variables are to be deﬁned. The canonical sample space is deﬁned as Ω := (X × Y × A1 × A2 ×R+)∞ . The history
spaces are deﬁned as
H0 := X × Y , Hn+1 :=Hn × A1 × A2 ×R+ × X × Y , n ∈ N0.
The entire history hn := (x0, y0,a10,a20, t0, . . . ,a1n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, xn, yn) at time n is not available to the players for decision
making. The players have to make their decisions based only on the observed history or information vector given by in :=
(y0,a10,a
2
0, t0, . . . ,a
1
n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, yn), and the distribution ψ of initial state. The estimation of the initial state can again be
reﬁned by taking the realization of Y0 in consideration. To do that, let q0(· | ·) :P(X) →P(X × Y ) be deﬁned by
q0(x, y | ψ) := Q 0(y | x)ψ(x), x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
Let q¯0(y | ψ) :=∑x∈X q0(x, y | ψ). Disintegrate q0(x, y | ψ) by
q0(x, y | ψ) = q¯0(y | ψ)Q¯ 0(x | ψ, y) (1)
where Q¯ 0(x | ψ, y) is a version of the regular conditional law deﬁned q¯0(· | ψ) almost surely. Fix a version from this
equivalence class and keep it ﬁxed thereafter. Let ψ0(x) := Q¯ 0(x | ψ, y0), which is the a posteriori distribution of X0 given
the a priori distribution ψ and initial observation y0. We deﬁne the information spaces as follows:
I0 := Y , In+1 := In × A1 × A2 ×R+ × Y , n ∈ N0.
An admissible strategy for ith player is a sequence π i = {π in}n∈N0 where π in : P(X) × In → P(Ai) is Borel measurable.
The set of all admissible strategies of ith player is denoted by Π i . With ψ ∈ P(X) and a pair of admissible strategies
(π1,π2) ∈ Π1 × Π2 speciﬁed, there exists a unique probability measure Pπ1,π2ψ on (Ω,B(Ω)) satisfying
Pπ
1,π2
ψ
(
x0, y0,da
1
0,da
2
0,dt0, . . . ,da
1
n−1,da2n−1,dtn−1, xn, yn
)
= ψ(x0)Q 0(y0 | x0)π10
(
da10
∣∣ψ0, y0)π20 (da20 ∣∣ψ0, y0)P F (dt0 ∣∣ x0,a10,a20)
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(
x1
∣∣ x0,a10,a20)Q (y1 ∣∣ a10,a20, x1) · · ·π1n−1(da1n−1 ∣∣ψ0, y0,a10,a20, t0, . . . , yn−1)
× π2n−1
(
da2n−1
∣∣ψ0, y0,a10,a20, t0, . . . , yn−1)P F (dtn−1 ∣∣ xn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1)
× P S
(
xn
∣∣ xn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1)Q (yn ∣∣ a1n−1,a2n−1, xn). (2)
From the construction of the probability space (Ω,B(Ω), Pπ1,π2ψ ) it is clear that the state, observation, actions, holding
time, history and information processes, denoted by {Xn}, {Yn}, {A1n}, {A2n}, {Tn}, {Hn}, {In}, respectively, can be deﬁned by
the projections:
Xn(ω) = xn, Yn(ω) = yn, A1n(ω) = a1n, A2n(ω) = a2n, Tn(ω) = tn, Hn(ω) = hn, In(ω) = in
for each realization ω = (x0, y0,a10,a20, t0, . . . ,a1n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, xn, yn, . . .) ∈ Ω , where xi ∈ X , yi ∈ Y , a1i ∈ A1, a2i ∈ A2, ti ∈
R
+ . The sequences A1n , A2n denote the action processes of player 1 and 2, respectively.
Now we make the following assumption.
(A1) There exist δ0 > 0, 1 ε0 > 0 such that
P F
([0, δ0] ∣∣ x,a1,a2) 1− ε0 ∀x ∈ X,a1 ∈ A1,a2 ∈ A2.
We set
(
X ′t, Y ′t , A′1t , A′2t
) :=
{
(Xn, Yn, A1n, A
2
n) if T0 + T1 + · · · + Tn−1  t < T0 + T1 + · · · + Tn,
(X0, Y0, A10, A
2
0) if 0 t < T0.
(3)
Remark 2.1. (A1) ensures that the number of transitions in any ﬁnite interval is always ﬁnite a.s. Indeed we have
Eπ1,π2ψ
(
e−Σ∞n=0Tn
∣∣ X0, Y0, A10, A20, X1, · · ·)= 0.
Thus
∑∞
n=0 Tn = ∞ a.s. Hence X ′t, Y ′t , A′1t , A′2t in (3) are well deﬁned for all t > 0.
We now turn to average payoff evaluation of the POSMG model over the inﬁnite time horizon. For an initial distribution
ψ ∈P(X) and a pair of strategies (π1,π2) ∈ Π1 × Π2, the average payoff of player I from player II is given by
Vπ1,π2 (ψ) = limsup
n→∞
Eπ
1,π2
ψ
∫ Sn
0 r(X
′
t , A
′1
t , A
′2
t )dt
Eπ
1,π2
ψ Sn
= limsup
n→∞
Eπ
1,π2
ψ
∑n
m=0 r(Xm, A1m, A2m)τ (Xm, A1m, A2m)
Eπ
1,π2
ψ
∑n
m=0 τ (Xm, A1m, A2m)
(4)
where Eπ
1,π2
ψ denotes the expectation with respect to P
π1,π2
ψ and Sn denotes partial sum sequence of {Tn}∞n=0 and S−1 is
deﬁned as 0 a.s. and τ (Xn, A1n, A
2
n) :=
∫∞
0 t P F (dt | Xn, A1n, A2n).
Player I wishes to maximize (4) over his strategies π1 ∈ Π1 where as player II wishes to minimize the same over
π2 ∈ Π2. Our aim is to prove the existence of a saddle point equilibrium which is established in Section 4. To this end we
ﬁrst describe an equivalent COSMG model in the next section.
3. Equivalent COSMGmodel
Given a partially observed semi-Markov game model (X, Y , A1, A2, P S , P F , Q , Q 0, r), we construct an equivalent, com-
pletely observed semi-Markov game (COSMG) model ( X˜ , A1, A2, P˜ S , P˜ F , r˜). We ﬁrst describe the model; the equivalence is
established later.
In the COSMG model X˜ := Y ×P(X) is the state space and A1, A2 are the action spaces. A typical element (y,ψ) of X˜
is denoted by x˜. Deﬁne a stochastic kernel q on R+ × X × Y given P(X) × A1 × A2 as follows: for S ∈ B(R+), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y ,
set
q
(
S × {x} × {y} ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)= ∑
x′∈X
∫
S
Q
(
y
∣∣ a1,a2, x)P S(x ∣∣ x′,a1,a2)P F (dt ∣∣ x′,a1,a2)ψ(x′). (5)
Disintegrating q, we obtain
q
(
dt, x, y
∣∣ψ,a1,a2)= q¯(dt, y ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)Q¯ (x ∣∣ψ,a1,a2, t, y) (6)
where q¯(dt, y | ψ,a1,a2) is the image of q(dt, x, y | ψ,a1,a2) under the projection from R+ × X × Y to R+ × Y , and Q¯ (x |
ψ,a1,a2, t, y) is a version of the regular conditional law, deﬁned q¯(·, · | ψ,a1,a2) almost surely.
Eq. (6) leads to the ﬁltering equation to be established in (11). The probability measures q¯ and Q¯ as in (6) induce
a probability measure P˜ S on X˜ , which is a measurable function of (ψ,a1,a2), deﬁned by
P˜ S
({y} × Λ ∣∣ψ,a1,a2) := q¯({t: Q¯ (· ∣∣ψ,a1,a2, t, y) ∈ Λ}× {y} ∣∣ψ,a1,a2),
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the distribution Φ(ψ)(·) of initial state (Y0,Ψ0) in the COSMG model is deﬁned by
Φ(ψ)
({y} × Λ) := q¯0({y} ∩ {y: Q¯ 0(· | ψ, y) ∈ Λ} ∣∣ψ), y ∈ Y , Λ ∈ B(P(X)), (7)
where q¯0 and Q¯ 0 are as in (1). It is easy to see that Φ is Borel measurable.
The holding time distribution P˜ F in the COSMG is deﬁned as
P˜ F
(
dt
∣∣ψ,a1,a2) :=∑
x∈X
P F
(
dt
∣∣ x,a1,a2)ψ(x).
The reward function r˜i in the COSMG model is deﬁned by
r˜i
(
ψ,a1,a2
) :=∑
x∈X
ri
(
x,a1,a2
)
ψ(x), ψ ∈P(X), a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2.
The game in the COSMG model is played over an inﬁnite time horizon as follows. At the 0th decision epoch, the initial
state X˜0 = (Y0,Ψ0) is generated by a known distribution Φ ∈ P( X˜). Immediately the ith player chooses an action Ai0 ∈ Ai
simultaneously but independent to other player and conditional on the event that X˜0 = (y0,ψ0), Ai0 = ai0, the state remains
unchanged for a random time T0 distributed as P˜ F (dt | ψ0,a10,a20). Player I gets reward at a rate r˜(ψ0,a10,a20) from player II
during the interval [0, T0]. At the end of this interval the next state X˜1 = (Y1,Ψ1) gets generated by the stochastic kernel
P˜ S(· | ψ0,a10,a20). Subsequently players choose next actions and the game proceeds through inﬁnite transitions in a similar
manner. The past states, actions and holding times are of common knowledge of both the players and they can recall these
at any time they want. Thus the COSMG model is a stochastic game with perfect recall.
To formulate the game described above we construct the probability space on which all the random variables are to be
deﬁned. The canonical sample space corresponding to the COSMG model is deﬁned as
Ω˜ := (Y ×P(X) × A1 × A2 ×R+)∞
endowed with its Borel σ -ﬁeld B(Ω˜). A generic element ω˜ ∈ Ω˜ is of the form
ω˜ = (y0,ψ0,a10,a20, t0, y1,ψ1,a11,a21, t1, . . .).
The history spaces are deﬁned by
H˜0 := Y ×P(X), H˜n+1 := H˜n × A1 × A2 ×R+ × Y ×P(X).
In the COSMG model the entire history is available to the players for decision making. Thus an admissible strategy for ith
player is a sequence π˜ i = {π˜ in}n∈N0 of (Borel measurable) stochastic kernels π˜ in on Ai given H˜n . Let Π˜ i denote the set of all
admissible strategies of the ith player.
Let Φ ∈P( X˜) and (π˜1, π˜2) ∈ Π˜1 × Π˜2 be speciﬁed, then there exists a unique probability measure P˜ π˜1,π˜2Φ on (Ω˜,B(Ω˜))
satisfying
P˜ π˜
1,π˜2
Φ
(
dx˜0,da
1
0,da
2
0,dt0, . . . ,da
1
n−1,da2n−1,dtn−1,dx˜n
)
= Φ(dx˜0)π˜10
(
da10
∣∣ x˜0)π˜20 (da20 ∣∣ x˜0) P˜ F (dt0 ∣∣ψ0,a10,a20) P˜ S(dx˜1 ∣∣ψ0,a10,a20) · · · π˜1n−1(da1n−1 ∣∣ x˜0,a10,a20, t0, . . . , x˜n−1)
× π˜2n−1
(
da2n−1
∣∣ x˜0,a10,a20, t0, . . . , x˜n−1) P˜ F (dtn−1 ∣∣ψn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1) P˜ S(dx˜n ∣∣ψn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1) (8)
for all n ∈N. We write P˜ π˜1,π˜2(y,ψ) instead of P˜ π˜
1,π˜2
δ(y,ψ)
and also P˜ π˜
1,π˜2
ψ instead of P˜
π˜1,π˜2
Φ(ψ) , where Φ(ψ) is as in (7).
From the construction of the probability space (Ω˜,B(Ω˜), P˜ π˜1,π˜2Φ ) it is clear that the state, actions, holding time and
history processes, denoted by { X˜n}, {A1n}, {A2n}, {Tn}, {H˜n} respectively can be deﬁned on Ω˜ by the usual projections for
n 0
X˜n(ω˜) := (yn,ψn), A1n(ω˜) := a1n, A2n(ω˜) := a2n, Tn(ω˜) := tn,
H˜n(ω˜) :=
(
y0,ψ0,a
1
0,a
2
0, t0, y1,ψ1,a
1
1,a
2
1, t1, . . . , yn,ψn
)
.
The model ( X˜, A1, A2, P˜ S , P˜ F , r˜) thus constructed is clearly a COSMG model.
An admissible strategy π˜ i of the ith player in the COSMG model is said to be Markov if there exists a sequence of
measurable maps {λn}, λn : X˜ → P(Ai) such that π˜ i(· | h˜n) = λn(yn,ψn)(·). The set of all Markov strategies for the ith
player is denoted by Π˜ iM . A Markov strategy {λn} of ith player is said to be stationary if there exists a measurable map
λ : X˜ → P(Ai) such that λn = λ for all n. With an abuse of terminology we use λ itself to refer the stationary strategy of
ith player. The set of all stationary strategies of the ith player in the COSMG is denoted by Π˜ iS .
Remark 3.1. Assuming (A1) it is easy to show that the holding time distribution P˜ F in the COSMG also satisﬁes a similar
condition, i.e., for δ and ε as in (A1)
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([0, δ] ∣∣ψ,a1,a2) 1− ε ∀ψ ∈P(X), a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2
holds. Again as in Remark 2.1 one can show
∑∞
n=0 Tn = ∞ almost surely in COSMG model.
For payoff evaluation over the inﬁnite time horizon for the COSMG model we set
Ψ ′t :=
{
Ψn if T0 + T1 + · · · + Tn−1  t < T0 + T1 + · · · + Tn,
Ψ0 if 0 t < T0.
(9)
Note that Remark 3.1 implies that for each t ∈ [0,∞), Ψ ′(t) is deﬁned for all t . For a ﬁxed Φ ∈P( X˜) and a pair of strategies
(π˜1, π˜2) ∈ Π˜1 × Π˜2, in the inﬁnite horizon COSMG model the average reward received by player I from player II is given
by
V˜ π˜1,π˜2 (Φ) = limsup
n→∞
E˜π˜
1,π˜2
Φ
∫ Sn
0 r˜(Ψ
′
t , A
′1
t , A
′2
t )dt
E˜π˜
1,π˜2
Φ Sn
= limsup
n→∞
E˜π˜
1,π˜2
Φ
∑n
m=0 r˜(Ψm, A1m, A2m)τ˜ (Ψm, A1m, A2m)
E˜π˜
1,π˜2
Φ
∑n
m=0 τ˜ (Ψm, A1m, A2m)
(10)
where E˜π˜
1,π˜2
Φ denotes the expectation with respect to P˜
π˜1,π˜2
Φ and Sn denotes partial sum sequence of {Tn}∞n=0 and S−1
is deﬁned as 0 a.s. and τ˜ (Ψm, A1m, A
2
m) :=
∫∞
0 t P˜ F (dt | Ψm, A1m, A2m). We write V˜ iπ˜1,π˜2(x˜) instead of V˜ iπ˜1,π˜2(δx˜) and also
V˜ i
π˜1,π˜2
(ψ) instead of V˜ i
π˜1,π˜2
(Φ(ψ)).
We now establish the equivalence of the models POSMG and COSMG. Given ψ ∈ P(X) and an information vector in =
(y0,a10,a
2
0, t0, . . . , yn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, yn) ∈ In in the POSMG model, we construct ψ0,ψ1, . . . ,ψn in a recursive manner
from (6), (1) in the following way. Set
ψ0 = ψ0(ψ, i0) := Q¯ 0(· | ψ, y0),
ψs+1 = ψs+1(ψ, is+1) := Q¯
(· ∣∣ψs,a1s ,a2s , ts, ys+1), s = 0,1, . . . ,n − 1
}
. (11)
The following result in the POSMG model plays a crucial role in establishing its equivalence with the COSMG model. Let
F In = σ(Is, s n).
Lemma 3.1. Let (π1,π2) ∈ Π1 × Π2 and ψ ∈P(X). Then for any n ∈N0 , x ∈ X,
Pπ
1,π2
ψ
(
Xn = x
∣∣F In)= ψn(ψ, In)(x), Pπ1,π2ψ -a.s. (12)
Proof. The proof is standard, we refer to [9] and [10] for the details. 
The following results follow immediately from the above lemma.
Corollary 3.1. Let (π1,π2) ∈ Π1 × Π2 , ψ ∈P(X) and y ∈ Y , Λ ∈ B(P(X)). Then
Pπ
1,π2
ψ
(
Yn+1 = y,ψn+1(ψ, In+1) ∈ Λ
∣∣F In, A1n, A2n)= P˜ S({y} × Λ ∣∣ψn(ψ, In), A1n, A2n), Pπ1,π2ψ -a.s.
Corollary 3.2. Let (π1,π2) ∈ Π1 × Π2 , ψ ∈P(X). Then
Eπ
1,π2
ψ
[
r
(
Xn, A
1
n, A
2
n
) ∣∣F In, A1n, A2n]= r˜(ψn(ψ, In), A1n, A2n), Pπ1,π2ψ -a.s.
Given ψ ∈P(X), in = (y0,a10,a20, t0, . . . , yn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, yn) ∈ In we use (11), to obtain h˜n = (y0,ψ0,a10,a20, t0, . . . ,
yn−1,ψn−1,a1n−1,a2n−1, tn−1, yn,ψn) ∈ H˜n . We denote this correspondence by the map gn : P(X) × In → H˜n . We can then
assign to each strategy π˜ j ∈ Π˜ j , j = 1,2, in the COSMG model, a corresponding strategy π j = g∗(π˜ j) in the POSMG model,
deﬁned by
π
j
n (· | ψ, in) := π˜ jn
(· ∣∣ gn(ψ, in)). (13)
Lemma 3.2. The map g∗ is onto.
Proof. For each n ∈ N0, P(X) × In can be imbedded into H˜n in an obvious manner. Thus Π j can be imbedded into Π˜ j ,
j = 1,2. Let i denote this imbedding.
Clearly, (g∗ ◦ i)(π j) = π j for any π j ∈ Π j , j = 1,2. 
The next lemma states that (π˜1, π˜2) and (g∗(π˜1), g∗(π˜2)) result in the same reward for corresponding models. We refer
to [9] and [10] for the proof.
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model. Then
Vπ1,π2(ψ) = V˜ π˜1,π˜2 (ψ).
We use Lemma 3.3 to establish the equilibria in POSMG via the corresponding equilibria in COSMG. To this end we make
the following assumptions which will be in force in what follows.
(A2) For each x ∈ X the stochastic kernels P S(· | x,a1,a2), Q (· | a1,a2, x) and P F (· | x,a1,a2) are weakly continuous in
(a1,a2).
(A3) The reward function r(·, ·, ·) is bounded and continuous.
Remark 3.2. Note that under (A3), Vπ1,π2 (ψ) is well deﬁned. The boundedness assumption on r(·, ·, ·) can be relaxed by an
appropriate growth condition as done in [13]. We, however, work with (A3) for the sake of simplicity.
4. Saddle point equilibrium
First we deﬁne optimal strategies and value functions for two person zero sum case. A strategy π∗1 ∈ Π1 is said to be
optimal for player 1 in the POSMG model if
Vπ∗1,π2 (ψ) V¯ (ψ) := inf
π2∈Π2
sup
π1∈Π1
Vπ1,π2(ψ)
for any π2 ∈ Π2. The function V¯ is referred to as the upper value of the POSMG.
Similarly a strategy π∗2 ∈ Π2 is said to be optimal for player 2 if
Vπ1,π∗2(ψ) V(ψ) := sup
π1∈Π1
inf
π2∈Π2
Vπ1,π2(ψ)
for any π1 ∈ Π1. The function V is referred to as the lower value of the POSMG.
Thus a pair of optimal strategies (π∗1,π∗2) satisﬁes
Vπ1,π∗2(ψ) Vπ∗1,π∗2(ψ) Vπ∗1,π2(ψ)
for any π1 ∈ Π1,π2 ∈ Π2. Hence (π∗1,π∗2) constitutes a saddle point equilibrium. The POSMG is said to have a value if
V¯ (ψ) = V(ψ) =: V (ψ).
Note that if both the players have optimal strategies, then the POSMG has a value. In this section we prove the existence
of a value and optimal strategies for both players. The value function and the optimal strategies for the COSMG model is
deﬁned in the similar way.
Let V˜(Φ), ¯˜V (Φ) and V˜ (Φ) denote the lower-, upper- and the value (if it exists) of the COSMG.
Theorem 4.1. If the COSMG model has a value, then the POSMG model also has a value and
V (ψ) = V˜ (Φ(ψ)),
for any ψ ∈ P(X). Furthermore, if (π˜1, π˜2) ∈ Π˜1 × Π˜2 is a pair of saddle point strategies in the COSMG, then (π1,π2) =
(g∗(π˜1), g∗(π˜2)) is a pair of saddle-point strategies in the POSMG model.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. 
Remark 4.1. It may be interesting to compare the equivalence between COSMG and POSMG with the corresponding results
in partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDP). The treatment of POMDP is based on estimating the unobserved
state using the available information. The conditional distribution of the state given the available information is then used
as a basis for controlling systems with partial observation. In other words, one introduces a completely observed MDP
(COMDP) model where the conditional distribution of the state in POMDP model given the available information constitutes
the state in the COMDP model. One can then show that the conditional distributions of the states based on the available
information constitute a statistic suﬃcient for control, as do the available information themselves (see Chapter 10 in [2]).
In view of this the COMDP model is often referred to as separated control problem; the policies in the COMDP model are
referred to as separated policies. The ‘separation’ is carried out between the estimation and control; the observation is used
to estimate the unobserved state, and then the state estimate is used for control purpose. The observation process, though
available, is not used for control purpose. It is explained in [10] that the standard method of establishing the suﬃciency
of the conditional distributions for control purpose does not extend to the partially observed stochastic games (POSG). We
have worked around this diﬃculty by including both the conditional distribution and the observation as state variables in
the COSMG.
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notation for convenience. Let
τ˜ (ψ,λ,μ) :=
∫
A1
∫
A2
τ˜
(
ψ,a1,a2
)
λ
(
da1
)
μ
(
da2
)
,
r˜′(ψ,λ,μ) :=
∫
A1
∫
A2
r˜
(
ψ,a1,a2
)
τ˜
(
ψ,a1,a2
)
λ
(
da1
)
μ
(
da2
)
,
P∗S(Λ | ψ,λ,μ) :=
∫
A1
∫
A2
∑
Y
P˜ S
({y} × Λ ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)λ(da1)μ(da2).
To establish the existence of a value and optimal strategies in COSMG we study the following equations
v(ψ) = inf
μ∈P(A2)
sup
λ∈P(A1)
[
r˜′(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρτ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]
= sup
λ∈P(A1)
inf
μ∈P(A2)
[
r˜′(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρτ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]
. (14)
Note that in view of (A2), (A3), the inf–sup and sup–inf above are equal for a bounded continuous v by a standard minimax
theorem [6].
Theorem 4.2. If there is a bounded continuous function v and a constant ρ such that (14) holds, then under (A1)–(A3) there exists
a pair of saddle point stationary strategies (λ∗,μ∗) of the COSMG model, and ρ is the value of the game.
Proof. Let (λ∗,μ∗) ∈ Π˜1S × Π˜2S be such that
v(ψ) = sup
λ∈P(A1)
[
r˜′
(
ψ,λ,μ∗(ψ)
)+ ∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ,μ∗(ψ))− ρτ˜ (ψ,λ,μ∗(ψ))]
= inf
μ∈P(A2)
[
r˜′
(
ψ,λ∗(ψ),μ
)+ ∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ∗(ψ),μ)− ρτ˜ (ψ,λ∗(ψ),μ)]. (15)
The existence of (λ∗,μ∗) is guaranteed by a standard measurable selection theorem (see [16]). Let π˜2 ∈ Π˜2 and ψ ∈P(X).
Then from Eq. (15) we have
v(Ψn) r˜′
(
Ψn, λ
∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)
)+ ∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n))− ρτ˜ (Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)).
Now
E˜λ
∗,π˜2
ψ
[
v(Ψn+1)
∣∣ H˜n]=
∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n))
 v(Ψn) + ρτ˜
(
Ψn, λ
∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)
)− r˜′(Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)).
Thus
N−1∑
n=0
(
v(Ψn) − E˜λ∗,π˜2ψ
[
v(Ψn+1)
∣∣ H˜n])+ ρ N−1∑
n=0
τ˜
(
Ψn, λ
∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)
)

N−1∑
n=0
r˜′
(
Ψn, λ
∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)
)
.
Taking expectations on both sides, dividing by E˜λ
∗,π˜2
ψ
∑N−1
n=0 τ˜ (Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n)), and letting N → ∞, we obtain
limsup
N→∞
[v(ψ) − E˜λ∗,π˜2ψ v(ΨN )]
E˜λ
∗,π˜2
ψ
∑N−1
n=0 τ˜ (Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n))
+ ρ  limsup
N→∞
E˜λ
∗,π˜2
ψ
∑N−1
n=0 r˜′(Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n))
E˜λ
∗,π˜2
ψ
∑N−1
n=0 τ˜ (Ψn, λ∗(Ψn), π˜2n (H˜n))
.
The limit on the left side goes to zero as v is bounded and the denominator diverges (follows from Remark 3.1). Since the
limit on the right side is V˜λ∗,π˜2(ψ), we get ρ  V˜λ∗,π˜2(ψ) for all π˜2 ∈ Π˜2. That is
ρ  inf
π˜2
V˜λ∗,π˜2(ψ) sup
1
inf
π˜2
V˜ π˜1,π˜2(ψ) = V˜ (ψ).
π˜
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ρ  inf
π˜2
sup
π˜1
V˜ π˜1,π˜2 (ψ) = ¯˜V (ψ).
Thus ¯˜V (ψ) = supπ˜1 V˜ π˜1,μ∗(ψ) = ρ = infπ˜2 V˜λ∗,π˜2(ψ) = V˜ (ψ). Therefore ρ is the value of the game and the pair of station-
ary strategies (λ∗,μ∗) is optimal. 
Remark 4.2. It is important to note that the speciﬁc structure of stochastic kernel of COSMG ensures that the saddle point
strategies have no explicit dependence on the observation process. Thus for optimal strategies both the players use obser-
vation only for estimating the unobserved state, and then use this state estimate for control purpose. Thus a separation
principle is established in an indirect manner in the sense that though the state space in COSMG model is Y × P(X) the
stationary saddle point strategies depend only on the current state belonging to P(X).
To ensure the existence of (ρ, v) satisfying Eq. (14), we make the following assumptions.
(A4) There exist a state x∗ , an observation y∗ and positive numbers α and γ (0 < α,γ  1) such that
P S
(
x∗
∣∣ x,a1,a2) α ∀x,a1,a2,
Q
(
y∗
∣∣ a1,a2, x)= {γ if x = x∗,
0 else.
(A5) There exists τ2 > 0 such that τ (x,a1,a2) τ2 ∀x,a1,a2.
Let τ1 := δ0ε0, where δ0, ε0 are as in (A1). Then we have 0 τ1  τ (x,a1,a2) τ2 ∀x,a1,a2.
Remark 4.3. (i) Note that to treat the average pay-off case one needs some kind of an ergodicity assumption. Assumption
(A4) is one such ergodicity assumption. This assumption may be satisﬁed in a manufacturing system where the state rep-
resents the total number of working machines in all workstations put together. The observation is the product output. Note
that the state where all the machines are non-functional, will satisfy an assumption like (A4).
(ii) The second assumption in (A4) means that there is a column of Q (· | a1,a2, ·) which has only one nonzero entry γ
at the row of x∗ , for all a1, a2. This can be relaxed to the condition that Q (y∗ | a1,a2, x∗) = γ (a1,a2) > 0.
Lemma 4.1. Under (A4)
(i) P˜ S
((
y∗, δ{x∗}(·)
) ∣∣ψ,a1,a2) γα ∀ψ,a1,a2,
where δ{x∗}(x) is the probability measure on X such that δ{x∗}(x∗) = 1.
(ii) Let U be in B(Y ×P(X)), then
P˜ S
(
U
∣∣ψ,a1,a2)− P˜ S(U ∣∣ψ ′,b1,b2) 1− γα
for all ψ,ψ ′ ∈P(X); a1,b1 ∈ A1; a2,b2 ∈ A2 .
Proof. (i) We have Q¯ (x | ψ,a1,a2, t, y∗) = δx∗ (x) for all t . Hence for all ψ , a1, a2
P˜ S
((
y∗, δx∗ (·)
) ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)= q¯({t: Q¯ (x ∣∣ψ,a1,a2, t, y∗)= δx∗ (x)}× {y∗} ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)= q¯((R+ × {y∗}) ∣∣ψ,a1,a2)
=
∑
x′∈X
∞∫
0
∑
x∈X
Q
({
y∗
} ∣∣ a1,a2, x)P S(x ∣∣ x′,a1,a2)P F (dt ∣∣ x′,a1,a2)ψ(x′)
=
∑
x′∈X
γ P S
(
x∗
∣∣ x′,a1,a2)P F (R+ ∣∣ x′,a1,a2)ψ(x′) γα.
(ii) Let U ∈ B(Y ×P(X). We will consider two different cases to prove the inequality. If (y∗, δx∗ (·)) ∈ U from (i) we get,
− P˜ S (U | ψ ′,b1,b2)  −γα, hence P˜ S (U | ψ,a1,a2) − P˜ S (U | ψ ′,b1,b2)  1 − γα. Again if (y∗, δx∗ (·)) /∈ U from (i) we get
P˜ S(U | ψ,a1,a2) 1− γα, hence P˜ S(U | ψ,a1,a2) − P˜ S (U | ψ ′,b1,b2) 1− γα. 
The proof of the following result is simple, and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.2. Under assumptions (A1) and (A5),
0 τ1  τ˜
(
ψ,a1,a2
)
 τ2 ∀ψ,a1,a2.
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constant c. This motivates to study the solution of (14) using a span contraction method as in [8,11]. Let Cb(P(X)) be the
set of bounded continuous functions on P(X).
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let v ∈ Cb(P(X)). The span seminorm of v is deﬁned as
sp(v) = sup
ψ∈P(X)
v(ψ) − inf
ψ∈P(X)
v(ψ).
Let T : Cb(P(X)) → Cb(P(X)). We say that T is a span contraction if for some β ∈ [0,1),
sp
(
T (u) − T (v)) β sp(u − v) for all u, v ∈ Cb(P(X)).
Clearly, sp(v) = 0 if and only if v = constant. We introduce the following equivalence relation ∼ in Cb(P(X)). We
say that v1 ∼ v2 if and only if v1 − v2 = constant. Let C˜b(P(X)) := Cb(P(X))/ ∼. On this quotient space sp(·) be-
comes a norm. If T :Cb(P(X)) → Cb(P(X)) is a span-contraction, then it is easily seen that the canonically induced map
T˜ : C˜b(P(X)) → C˜b(P(X)) is a contraction and thus has a unique ﬁxed point. It then follows that T itself has a span-ﬁxed
point, i.e., there exists a function v ∈ Cb(P(X)) such that sp(T (v)− v) = 0 or equivalently T (v)− v = constant, and any two
such ﬁxed points must differ by some constant.
Deﬁne a family of operators {Tρ}ρ∈R by
Tρ(v)(ψ) = inf
μ∈P(A2)
sup
λ∈P(A1)
[
r˜′(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρτ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]
= sup
λ∈P(A1)
inf
μ∈P(A2)
[
r˜′(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρτ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]
. (16)
Again note that by (A2)–(A3) the inf–sup, sup–inf above are equal by Fan’s minimax theorem [6].
Lemma 4.3. Under (A2), (A3) and (A4), Tρ has a span ﬁxed point on Cb(P(X)) for each ρ .
Proof. Under (A2) and (A3), Tρ :Cb(P(X)) → Cb(P(X)). Since, Tρ(v + c) = c + Tρ(v), the canonically induced map
T˜ρ : C˜b(P(X)) → C˜b(P(X)) is well deﬁned. Let v˜1, v˜2 ∈ C˜b(P(X)); for a ﬁxed ψ0 ∈ P(X), we can always choose the rep-
resentatives v1, v2 of the classes v˜1, v˜2 such that v1(ψ0) = v2(ψ0) = 0. Let ψ,ψ ′ ∈ P(X) and let λi , μi be the outer
maximum and outer minimum in the expression of Tρ(vi)(ψ), respectively; i = 1,2 and let λ′i , μ′i be the outer maximum
and outer minimum in the expression of Tρ(vi)(ψ ′), respectively; i = 1,2. In view of (A2), (A3) these maxima and minima
are realized. Then we have(
Tρ(v1) − Tρ(v2)
)
(ψ) − (Tρ(v1) − Tρ(v2))(ψ ′)
∫
P(X)
(v1 − v2)(ψ1)
[
P∗S (dψ1 | ψ,λ1,μ2) − P∗S
(
dψ1
∣∣ψ ′, λ′2,μ′1)].
Since for any bounded signed measure ν and v ∈ Cb(P(X)) which vanishes at some point in P(X)∫
P(X)
v(y) ν(dy)max
(|ν+|, |ν−|) sp(v)
it follows using Lemma 4.1(ii), that
max
(∣∣( P˜ S (· | ψ,λ1,μ2) − P˜ S(· ∣∣ψ ′, λ′2,μ′1))+∣∣, ∣∣( P˜ S(· | ψ,λ1,μ2) − P˜ S(· ∣∣ψ ′, λ′2,μ′1))−∣∣) 1− γα.
Thus we obtain(
Tρ(v1) − Tρ(v2)
)
(ψ) − (Tρ(v1) − Tρ(v2))(ψ ′) (1− γα) sp(v1 − v2),
i.e.,
sp
(
Tρ(v1) − Tρ(v2)
)
 (1− γα) sp(v1 − v2). (17)
Hence sp(T˜ρ(v˜1)− T˜ρ(v˜2)) (1−γα) sp(v˜1 − v˜2) for any v˜1, v˜2 ∈ C˜b(P(X)). Thus T˜ρ is a contraction on C˜b(P(X)). There-
fore T˜ρ has a ﬁxed point in C˜b(P(X)). Hence the result follows. 
Remark 4.4. Note that in MDP and stochastic game ([11] and [8]) the corresponding operator T does not depend on ρ .
Thus the existence of a span ﬁxed point of T insures the existence of a unique (modulo an additive constant) solution of
the corresponding dynamic programing equation for the average cost criterion (the counterpart of (14)). This is not the case
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does not suﬃce our purpose. We need to ﬁnd a ρ∗ for which Tρ∗ has a ﬁxed point. The following theorem ensures the
existence of such a ρ∗ .
Theorem 4.3. Let ψ0 ∈ P(X) be arbitrarily ﬁxed. Then under (A1)–(A5) there exists a unique solution (ρ∗, v∗) ∈ R × Cb(P(X)) to
Eq. (14) satisfying v∗(ψ0) = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3, for each ρ ∈ R there exists v ∈ Cb(P(X)) and a constant c(ρ) ∈ R such that Tρ(v)(ψ) = c(ρ) + v(ψ)
for all ψ ∈P(X). Let vρ(ψ) := v(ψ) − v(ψ0). Then vρ(ψ0) = 0 and it satisﬁes
Tρ(vρ)(ψ) = c(ρ) + vρ(ψ). (18)
It is easy to show that such (c(ρ), vρ) is a unique in R× Cb(P(X)) for a given ρ . Now we show the existence of a unique
ρ∗ such that c(ρ∗) = 0. Take ρ1 > ρ2, vi := vρi and let λi , μi be the outer maximum and outer minimum in the expression
of Tρi (vi)(ψ), respectively. Therefore Tρi (vi)(ψ) = vi(ψ) + c(ρi), i = 1,2. Hence we get
(v1 − v2)(ψ) +
(
c(ρ1) − c(ρ2)
)= sup
λ∈P(A1)
inf
μ∈P(A2)
[
r˜(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v1(ψ
′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρ1τ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]
− inf
μ∈P(A2)
sup
λ∈P(A1)
[
r˜(ψ,λ,μ) +
∫
P(X)
v2(ψ
′) P∗S (dψ ′ | ψ,λ,μ) − ρ2τ˜ (ψ,λ,μ)
]

∫
P(X)
v1(ψ
′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ1,μ2)− ρ1τ˜ (ψ,λ1,μ2)
−
∫
P(X)
v2(ψ
′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ1,μ2)+ ρ2τ˜ (ψ,λ1,μ2).
Let v(ψ) := v1(ψ) − v2(ψ), v+ := sup v , v− := inf v . Thus we get
c(ρ1) − c(ρ2)
[ ∫
P(X)
v(ψ ′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ1,μ2)
]
− v(ψ) − (ρ1 − ρ2)τ˜ (ψ,λ1,μ2)

[
v+ − v(ψ)
]− (ρ1 − ρ2)τ˜ (ψ,λ1,μ2).
Similarly we get
c(ρ1) − c(ρ2)
[
v− − v(ψ)
]− (ρ1 − ρ2)τ˜ (ψ,λ2,μ1).
Now given ε > 0 there are ψ1, ψ2 ∈P(X) such that v+ − v(ψ1) < ε and v− − v(ψ2) > −ε.
Thus we get using Lemma 4.2
−ε − (ρ1 − ρ2)τ2 < c(ρ1) − c(ρ2) < ε − (ρ1 − ρ2)τ1.
Thus
−(ρ1 − ρ2)τ2  c(ρ1) − c(ρ2)−(ρ1 − ρ2)τ1. (19)
The above inequalities show the Lipschitz continuity of c(ρ). The right side inequality above shows that c(ρ) is strictly
decreasing and c(ρ) ↓↓ −∞ as ρ → ∞. Similarly the left inequality above shows that c(ρ) ↑↑ ∞ as ρ → −∞. Hence we
conclude that there is a unique ρ∗ such that c(ρ∗) = 0.
Let v∗ := vρ∗ . Therefore Tρ∗ (v∗) = v∗ . Hence (ρ∗, v∗) is the unique solution of Eq. (14) satisfying v∗(ψ0) = 0. 
We now establish the main result of our paper.
Theorem 4.4. Under assumptions (A1)–(A5) the POSMG has a value and there is a saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.2 and 4.3 that the COSMG has a value ρ∗ and has a saddle point equilibrium (λ∗,μ∗)
(as in (15)) in stationary strategies. Using Theorem 4.1 it follows that (π∗1,π∗2) := (g∗(λ∗), g∗(μ∗)) is the saddle point
equilibrium of the original POSMG model. 
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Based on the existence result in Theorem 4.3, we now develop the value iteration scheme to obtain approximations to
the value ρ∗ . It follows from (18) and (19) that ρ∗ is the unique zero of c(·). However the argument leading to this result is
of existential nature only. Thus these do not lead to a constructive method of ﬁnding ρ∗ . We now construct a sequence of
functions cn(·) which converges to c(·) pointwise. For this we deﬁne the value iteration functions vnρ ∈ Cb(P(X)) as follows:
v0ρ ≡ 0 and for n 1
vnρ := Tnρ v0ρ, (20)
cn−1(ρ) := vnρ(ψ0) − vn−1ρ (ψ0), (21)
where Tρ is as deﬁned in (16) and ψ0 ∈P(X) is arbitrarily ﬁxed. The following lemmas show the pointwise convergence of
the sequence cn(·) to c(·).
Lemma 5.1. Assume (A4). For ρ ∈R∣∣cn(ρ) − c(ρ)∣∣ (1− γα)n sp(vρ).
Proof. Set
unρ := vnρ − vρ.
Then using (17), (18) and (20), we have
sp
(
unρ
)= sp(Tρ(vn−1ρ )− Tρ(vρ) + c(ρ)) (1− γα) sp(vn−1ρ − vρ)= (1− γα) sp(un−1ρ ).
Hence
sp
(
unρ
)
 (1− γα)n sp(vρ). (22)
Again from (16) and (20)
un+1ρ (ψ) = Tρ
(
vnρ
)
(ψ) − vρ(ψ) = Tρ
(
unρ + vρ
)
(ψ) − vρ(ψ)
∫
P(X)
unρ(ψ
′) P∗S
(
dψ ′
∣∣ψ,λ∗, μ¯)+ c(ρ)
where λ∗ and μ¯ are the outer maximum and outer minimum in the expression of Tρ(vρ)(ψ) and Tρ(vnρ)(ψ), respectively.
Thus
inf
ψ
un+1ρ (ψ) inf
ψ
unρ(ψ) + c(ρ). (23)
Similarly,
sup
ψ
un+1ρ (ψ) sup
ψ
unρ(ψ) + c(ρ). (24)
We also have
inf
ψ
un+1ρ (ψ) − sup
ψ
unρ(ψ)un+1ρ (ψ0) − unρ(ψ0) sup
ψ
un+1ρ (ψ) − inf
ψ
unρ(ψ)
which implies (using (23) and (24))
c(ρ) + inf
ψ
unρ(ψ) − sup
ψ
unρ(ψ)vn+1ρ (ψ0) − vnρ(ψ0) sup
ψ
unρ(ψ) − inf
ψ
unρ(ψ) + c(ρ).
Using (21) we get from the above
− sp(unρ) cn(ρ) − c(ρ) sp(unρ).
Finally the above inequality together with (22) gives the desired result. 
Lemma 5.2. Assume (A1), (A4) and (A5). Then there exist positive constants k1 and k2 such that∣∣cn(ρ) − c(ρ)∣∣ (1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρ|) for all ρ ∈ R. (25)
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sp(vρ1 − vρ2 ) sp(Tρ1 vρ1 − Tρ2 vρ2 ) +
∣∣c(ρ1) − c(ρ2)∣∣
 sp(Tρ1 vρ1 − Tρ1 vρ2 ) + sp(Tρ1 vρ2 − Tρ2 vρ2 ) + (ρ1 − ρ2)τ2
 (1− γα) sp(vρ1 − vρ2 ) + (τ2 − τ1)(ρ1 − ρ2) + (ρ1 − ρ2)τ2
 (1− γα) sp(vρ1 − vρ2 ) + (2τ2 − τ1)(ρ1 − ρ2)
where τ1 and τ2 are as in (A5). Therefore
sp(vρ1 − vρ2 )
(2τ2 − τ1)
γ α
(ρ1 − ρ2).
This leads to
sp(vρ) = sp(vρ − v0 + v0) sp(vρ − v0) + sp(v0) (2τ2 − τ1)
γ α
|ρ| + sp(v0).
Let k1 = sp(v0) and k2 = (2τ2−τ1)γ α . Then the desired result follows from Lemma 5.1. 
It follows from Lemma 5.2 that for each ρ , cn(ρ) converges to c(ρ). We now use the estimate (25) to obtain a sequence
{ρn}n such that ρn → ρ∗ as n → ∞.
Deﬁne the sequence {ρn} iteratively as follows: let ρ0 be an arbitrarily ﬁxed real number and for n = 0,1, . . . , set
cn := cn(ρn),
ρn+1 := ρn + cnτ2
}
, (26)
where τ2 is as in (A5).
Theorem 5.1. Assume (A1)–(A5). Then {ρn} (as in (26)) converges to ρ∗ , the unique zero of c(·).
Proof. From (26) and Lemma 5.2 we have
1
τ2
[−(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|)+ c(ρn)] ρn+1 − ρn  1
τ2
[
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|)+ c(ρn)]. (27)
Fix an n. There are two possibilities:
(i) cn  0,
(ii) cn  0.
Suppose cn  0. Then using (26) we get ρn+1  ρn . Hence from (19) it follows that
(ρn − ρn+1)τ2  c(ρn+1) − c(ρn) (ρn − ρn+1)τ1. (28)
Combining the right most and the left most inequalities of (27) and (28) respectively we get
c(ρn) − c(ρn+1) (1− γα)n
(
k1 + k2|ρn|
)+ c(ρn),
c(ρn+1)−(1− γα)n
(
k1 + k2|ρn|
)
. (29)
Combining the left most and the right most inequalities of (27) and (28) respectively we get(
1− τ1
τ2
)
c(ρn) + τ1
τ2
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|) c(ρn+1). (30)
From (19) and (29) we get
ρn  ρn+1  ρ∗ + 1
τ1
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|). (31)
Suppose cn  0. Then using (26) we get ρn+1  ρn . Hence from (19) it follows that
(ρn+1 − ρn)τ2  c(ρn) − c(ρn+1) (ρn+1 − ρn)τ1. (32)
Combining the left most inequalities of (27) and (32) respectively we get
c(ρn) − c(ρn+1)−(1− γα)n
(
k1 + k2|ρn|
)+ c(ρn), (33)
c(ρn+1) (1− γα)n
(
k1 + k2|ρn|
)
. (34)
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1− τ1
τ2
)
c(ρn) − τ1
τ2
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|) c(ρn+1). (35)
Thus from (19) and (33) we get
ρn  ρn+1  ρ∗ − 1
τ1
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|). (36)
We next show that the sequence {ρn} is bounded. Choose a positive integer N such that
1
τ1
(1− γα)Nk2 < 1
2
.
Let
R1 := 2
(
ρ∗ + 1
τ1
(1− γα)Nk1
)
, R2 := 2
(
ρ∗ − 1
τ1
(1− γα)Nk1
)
.
Then for n N , using (31) and (36), we have
ρn  ρn+1 
1
2
(
R1 + |ρn|
)
 1
2
(|R1| + |ρn|) if cn  0, (37)
ρn  ρn+1 
1
2
(
R2 − |ρn|
)
−1
2
(|R2| + |ρn|) if cn  0. (38)
From the inequality (37) it is immediate that if for some n N , ρn > |R1|, then cn < 0 which implies (from (26)) ρn+1 < ρn .
Similarly (38) implies if for some n N , ρn < −|R2|, we have ρn+1 > ρn . Further if for some n N , ρn ∈ [−|R2|, |R1|], then
next iterate ρn+1 also lies in the interval [−|R2|, |R1|], i.e.,
ρn ∈
[−|R2|, |R1|] ⇒ ρn+1 ∈ [−|R2|, |R1|].
Thus the sequence {ρn} is bounded.
Combining the inequalities (29), (30), (33) and (35) we obtain
c(ρn+1) ∈
[
−(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|),
(
1− τ1
τ2
)
c(ρn) + τ1
τ2
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|)
]
∪
[(
1− τ1
τ2
)
c(ρn) − τ1
τ2
(1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|), (1− γα)n(k1 + k2|ρn|)
]
.
Since {ρn} is bounded and 1− τ1τ2 ∈ (0,1), the above range of c(ρn+1) shrinks to {0} as n → ∞. Thus c(ρn) converges to 0.
Since c(·) is continuous and ρ∗ is the only zero of c(·) we get ρn → ρ∗ . 
6. Conclusion
We have studied a zero-sum partially observed semi-Markov game with average payoff on a countable state space. Under
certain conditions on state transition probabilities and holding time distributions it is shown that a saddle point equilibrium
exists. The value is shown to be the zero of a Lipschitz continuous function. By exploiting this fact a value iteration scheme
is developed to obtain the average value of the game.
It is well known that Markov decision processes (one player game) with average payoff criterion is not a single problem
but a collection of problems, some of which do not have nice solutions. Thus a variety of approaches have been developed
to handle different situations. Not surprisingly this is one chapter of Markov decision theory that is anything but closed [1].
Markov decision processes with partial observation is indeed a very involved problem. The main diﬃculty lies in identifying
conditions on kernel P S and Q which would ensure some ergodicity condition for the kernel P˜ S which would in turn
ensure the existence of a nice solution to (14). This has been achieved under a variety of conditions; see [3–5,7,11,12,17,
19] for related result in partially observed Markov decision processes. Also we have assumed that the jump times of the
state process are observable. If this is not the case, then we would require another process giving some information on the
jump times which would have to be included in the observation. This is indeed a challenging problem requiring further
investigation. In our paper we have made a beginning in this direction for semi-Markov games with partial observations.
Further investigation is needed to address this problem comprehensively.
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